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CASE NOTES
to consult the legislative history, which is usually resorted to only when
there is an ambiguity in the statutory language. In the light of the prior
decisions, it is difficult to detect any ambiguity in the amended statute. This
is true even though some of the previous judicial constructions may have
been dicta; they were nevertheless the only judicial definitions available to
Congress. Mergers were defined as asset acquisitions, and Congress only
extended the prohibitions of section 7 to asset acquisitions by corporations
subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC. Nothing could be less ambiguous,
particularly when one considers that the FTC was the agency requesting the
amendment. The ambiguity, where it existed, was in the legislative history
rather than the statutory language. 33 If the construction given by the Court
was the one intended, Congress, as the dissent stated, "went at the matter
in a very peculiar way."34
Given this extension of section 7, the remainder of the decision falls
logically into place. The Bank Merger Act did not oust jurisdiction over
mergers under the Clayton Act if that jurisdiction was already present.35
In addition, if section 7 is applicable, this merger would violate it. 3° Com-
mercial banking is a "line of commerce" and the four-county Philadelphia
area would constitute a relevant geographical area according to the previous
definitions of the Court." Since the new bank would have more than thirty
per cent of the banking business in this area, and since section 7 is designed
to prevent possible violations of the Sherman Act in their incipiency, the
necessary elements for an injunction appear to be present.
In conclusion, the primary problem with the decision is that Congress
may, by recognizing the peculiar nature of banking in relation to the rest of
the economy, have intended a different system of regulation: one that
would not rely on enforced competition through the somewhat mechanical
requirements of the Clayton Act, but one which would allow large, even
monopolistic, amalgamations, when in the opinion of the regulatory author-
ities, they are in the public interest. If this was the Congressional intent when
the section 7 amendment and the Bank Merger Act were passed, this intent
is frustrated by the Court in this decision.
JoHN M. TOBIN
Antitrust—Sherman Act—Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade to Elimi-
nate Competition by the Transfer of Ownership of Patent Rights.—
United States v. The Singer Mfg. Co.'—Singer Manufacturing Company,
the sole domestic manufacturer of household zigzag sewing machines, de-
veloped an improved multicam zigzag machine. Singer executed a non-
33 See note 25 and accompanying text.
37 Supra note 1, at 387.
33 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
36 For a discussion of the necessary elements for the maintenance of a section 7 suit,
see More Ado About Mergers: Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 159 (1962).
37 E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 8.
1 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
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exclusive cross-licensing agreement with Vigorelli, an Italian corporation own-
ing patent rights to a similar zigzag design. The agreement permitted Singer
to manufacture and sell machines under the Vigorelli patent. Prior to this
agreement Singer had purchased the American patent rights of a Canadian,
Harris, to be used by Singer in its reissued form with claims sufficiently broad
to dominate the zigzag market. In particular Singer was concerned about the
inroads made by a Japanese duplication of its machine introduced upon the
American market. Singer also discovered the existence of another zigzag
design upon file in Italy and owned by Gegauf, a Swiss corporation. If an
American patent application had been filed by Gegauf within one year of its
Italian filing date and had claimed the Italian filing date, the Harris patent
would be dominated in the United States by the American patent thereby
issued. Singer, knowing this, began negotiations with Gegauf concerning the
United States rights to the Gegauf patent application. Faced with an adamant
Gegauf, Singer used the dual pressure of the increasing Japanese competition
in the United States and Europe, and the possibility of an interference proceed-
ing before the Patent Office between the Harris patent and the Gegauf ap-
plication. Singer intimated that in any interference proceeding the Gegauf
claims could be severely limited by Singer. Faced with this threat and the
Japanese competition, Singer and Gegauf entered into a mutual, non-exclusive
cross-licensing agreement by which Singer could manufacture machines under
the Gegauf patent and Gegauf could use the Singer patents. The parties in
turn agreed "not to do anything, either directly or indirectly and in any
country, the result of which might restrict the scope of the claims of the other
party relating to the subject matter of the above mentioned patents and patent
applications . . . [and] in accordance with the laws and regulations of the
Patent Office concerned, to facilitate the allowance in any country of claims
as broad as possible. . . ." Subsequently, Singer, continuing to emphasize the
ability it would have as owner of the American patent, to eliminate the in-
fringing Japanese machines, convinced Gegauf to assign to Singer the entire
United States patent application. As the owner of the patent, Singer instituted
proceedings before the Tariff Commission to bar admittance to the infringing
Japanese machines. Infringement suits were likewise started in the United
States to test the validity of the Gegauf patent. The district court held that
no conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act was established since Singer's
primary purpose in all of the above transactions was to settle the conflict be-
tween the Harris and Gegauf patents. It also found a secondary purpose of
obtaining protection against the Japanese machines which might infringe the
Gegauf patent. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. HELD: The entire
series of actions amounted to a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 The conspiracy was deemed to have arisen from
the common intention of the parties, when transferring the patent rights, to
eliminate competition from the infringing Japanese.
Under the Sherman Act and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Act, conspiracies or combinations which are formed to exclude competition
2 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal...." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
180
CASE NOTES
from a particular field are per se violative of Section 1 of the Act. 3 The exist-
ence of the conspiracy can be inferred from the conduct of the parties or from
the general purpose of the combination' In the Singer case the Court thus con-
cluded that an illegal purpose—the exclusion of the infringing Japanese com-
petitors—pervaded the entire transaction and negated any legitimate business
purpose for the exchange of the patent rights.5 In so holding the Court refused
to differentiate between the elimination of competitors and the elimination of
competitors who are infringing valid patent rights. The intention to eliminate
competition, regardless of infringement or non-infringement, was thus held
to be illegal. Furthermore, the existence of the conspiracy to eliminate 'com-
petition was inferred from the exchange of patent rights—rights which by their
very nature are designed to eliminate competition. Thus, the Court drew within
the ambit of the Sherman Act activities which proceed inherently from the
monopoly grant of the patent law. This holding of a conspiracy in restraint of
trade based upon bare exchange of patent rights within a narrow commercial
area of a general field is believed to be a unique decision by the Supreme
Court, pointing to a further narrowing of the commercial utilization of patent
rights.
Previous cases involving patent-antitrust questions have dealt with allied
abuses of patents such as tying agreements requiring the purchase or sale of
unpatented products,° patent pools by which an entire industry was compart-
mentalized and monopolized, 7
 and attempts to fix the price of the patented
article at the retail level after sale by the patentee. 8 The Singer case stands
3
 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing deemed
intended to eliminate competition); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S.
208 (1939) (limitation on use deemed intended to eliminate competition); and United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (overpurchasing deemed intended
to fix prices and eliminate competition).
4
 "It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without
simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. .. • Acceptance by com-
petitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the neces-
sary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is suf-
ficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act." Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, supra note 3, at 227.
5 The facts found by the trial court attributed dual intentions to Singer in their
relationship with Gegauf, i.e., patent settlement and patent dominance to eliminate the
possibility of competition. The Supreme Court in rejecting one of these intentions or
purposes thereby impliedly overthrew a large segment of the facts found by the lower
court. Thereupon it interpreted the remaining facts found by the lower court to show the
existence of a conspiracy. "Whether a conspiracy exists is a question of ultimate fact but
whether the facts bring defendants within the prohibition of the statute is a question
of law." Gary Theatres Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 120 F.2d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 1941).
Thus the Court in the instant case stated that it was applying a legal standard as a question
of law to facts found by the lower court and accepted by the Supreme Court. Quaere:
Is this fact finding by the Supreme Court or reversal of mistakes of law? Cf. the
vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan.
6 Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); United States
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) ; and International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947).
7 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
8 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) ; and Boston Store of Chicago v. American
Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918).
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alone in holding that an exchange of patent rights in a competitive market
area violates the antitrust laws if the exchange was motivated by an intention
existing between the two parties that unlawful competition° might thereby be
eliminated. When such intention is shown, a per se violation of the Sherman
Act is found without any consideration of the degree of monopoly, the un-
reasonableness of the restraint or the fact that patents were involved—previous
questions which were deemed crucial in all patent-antitrust cases.
A patent is a statutorily created grant by Congress to the inventor of the
right to prevent others, for a period of seventeen years, from making, using or
selling the product or process claimed within the patent? The patent laws
allow the owner of the patent to assign, sell or license part of, or the entire
interest in the invention covered by the patent." Thus, by statute, a monopoly,
as well as "commerce" in this monopoly, is recognized in the particular inven-
tion. Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act "every ... combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . ." 12 is condemned as illegal.
This therefore continuously presents the delicate question of whether the
activity conducted by the patentee falls within the scope of the patent monop-
oly and is thereby governed by patent law, or goes beyond its scope and falls
within the purview of the general law and thereby becomes subject to the
Sherman Ace° So long as a party has maintained himself within the purview
of the patent monopoly, no question of antitrust law is involved. The difficulty
lies in determining where the patent monopoly ends and an abuse of the
monopoly begins in a given fact complex.
In holding activity as being beyond the ambit of the patent monopoly, the
Court has previously held that patent pools," wherein eighty-five per cent of
the industry was monopolized and uniform standards of output, sales, quality
and price were maintained, violated the Sherman Act. 15 This is clearly illegal
and "transcended what was necessary to protect the use of the patent or the
9 Although the parties believed that Gegauf's patent was dominant in the zigzag field
due to its scope and earlier date, Singer independently owned the Harris patent which it
originally hoped to have reissued with sufficient breadth to control the field. Therefore
both parties concerned had significant patent holdings prior to the exchange and the
Japanese activity was unlawful as individually applied to each party.
10 66 Stat. 804 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1958).
11 "Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of
personal property. Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be
assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or
legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his
application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United
States...." 66 Stat. 810 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1958).
12 Supra note 1.
13 "Beyond the 'limited monopoly' granted by the patent, the methods by which a
patent is exploited are 'subject to the general law.'" Transparent-Wrap Corp. v. Stokes
and Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 644 (1947); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S.
265 (1942).
14 Patent pool is not a word of art and has been defined as: "IA] group of patents
assembled under a common ownership or common control. The ownership may be in a
single company, in an agent for a group of companies or may be distributed through a
iroup of companies which exchange rights under their respective patents under varying
terms and conditions." 4 Toulmin, Treatise on the Antitrust Laws of the United States
534, § 19.1. They are furthermore not illegal per se.
19 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
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monopoly which the law conferred upon it. They [the activities] . . . accom-
plished a restraint of trade condemned by the Sherman law."" In considering
the rights conferred under the patent law, the Court in the Sanitary case"
stated: "Rights conferred by patents are indeed very definite and extensive,
but they do not give any more than other rights an universal license against
positive prohibitions. The Sherman law is a limitation of rights, rights which
may be pushed to evil consequences and therefore restrained."18
Prior to this case the Supreme Court established the rule that any condi-
tions, except those in their nature illegal, can be imposed by the patentee in
exchange for the right to manufacture, use or sell the article." This reasoning
was recently upheld with respect to grant backs of future inventions.20 Later
cases reaffirmed the standard as to whether or not the contract is itself illegal
or violative of valid statutes of the United States." The Court in the celebrated
General Electric case,22 in upholding the ability of a patentee to restrict the
sale price of a patented product on the retail level, stated the test as being
whether "the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably adapted to secure
pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly."23 This decision, while severely
limited by later cases,24 is still precedent, although perhaps merely for the
proposition that the resale prices of "agents" can be controlled by the patentee.
From these cases the rule appears to be that a patentee is entitled to use his
patent to obtain a reasonable reward for it, provided that in obtaining this
reward he does not transcend the "positive prohibitions" of the general law.
Examples of transcending the positive prohibitions of the general law
arose originally in the area of monopoly, where the Court held that absent a
showing of monopoly and the control of interstate markets inherently flowing
from such a monopoly, the cross license agreements did not necessarily sup-
press or unduly restrict competition; there had to be a definite factual showing
of illegality.25 Similarly in later cases where a clear monopoly was established,20
the Court continued to apply the test of having to show the existence of a
monopoly and control of interstate markets."
lC Id. at 48.
IT supra note 15.
18 Ibid. at 49.
18 Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
20 Transparent-Wrap v. Stokes and Smith, supra note 13.
21 "The right to make regulation in the public interest under the police power of the
States or in the exertion of the authority of Congress over matters within its constitu-
tional power is controlled by general principles of law, and the patent right confers no
privilege to make contracts in themselves illegal, and certainly not to make those
directly violative of valid statutes of the United States." United Shoe Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 258 U.S. 451, 463 (1922).
22 Supra note 8.
23 Supra note 8, at 490.
24 See, in particular, United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) where
the Court with only eight Justices sitting split on the question of overruling the General
Electric case
28 Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United Stites, 283 U.S. 163, 170 (1931).
26 Hartford-Empire v. United States; supra note 7.
27 The test of the Standard Oil case, supra note 24, continued to be applied. The
test developed in this case was that "Any agreement between competitors may be illegal
if part of a larger plan to control interstate markets. . . . Such contracts must be
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Subsequent cases involving attempts to fix retail prices developed some-
what different standards. In these cases the emphasis is placed upon the con-
certed activity of the licensees. Thus, a corporation holding a basic patent
could not constitute other competitive parties on the same level of competition
"agents" to sell at prices which it determined. 28 Similarly, the activity was
deemed beyond the ambit of patent rights where the entire industry was
licensed and prices were fixed by the license agreements. 2° The justification
for this lack of any requirement for monopoly or inquiry as to the reasonable-
ness of the activity lies in the per se illegality, in the absence of any patent, of
attempts to fix prices. The last case to consider the possibility of price fixing
as being within the patent grant" continued to emphasize the concerted
activity of the parties as being beyond the scope of the patent law and within
the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. In this case the Court deemed as crucial
the fact that one party was empowered to act as exclusive agent of the other
party for the determination of retail prices. It emphasized the requirement of
singularity of action. 31
In comparing each of these cases with the Singer case, the initial con-
clusion is that in all prior cases either a monopoly over an industry was
established or prices were fixed by means of cross license agreements. The
Singer case contained no allegations of monopoly or price fixing. The sole
basis for the finding of a conspiracy was the concerted activity of transferring
patent rights to the one of two parties best able to prevent infringement by a
third party, upon an invention under which both parties had previous rights."
The conclusion of conspiracy under the facts accepted by the Supreme Court,
that the parties were in agreement as to the objective of eliminating the
infringing Japanese competitors from the market, appears proper in view of
the emphasis in the recent price fixing cases upon the quasi per se illegality of
concerted activity by patentees and their licensees. It is submitted that in the
area of patent rights where the grant consists of an inherent monopoly, the
existence of a conspiracy in restraint of trade should be required to be more
clearly established than in the ordinary conspiratorial antitrust suit. This
requirement of caution arises from the ambivalence of valid patent objectives
and illegal restraint of trade objectives where patent rights are involved. It is
furthermore submitted that such continued emphasis upon concerted activity
to the derogation of the patent monopoly will lead to such a narrowing of the
scrutinized to ascertain whether the restraints imposed are regulations reasonable under
the circumstances, or whether their effect is to suppress or unduly restrict competition.
. . . Moreover, ... agreements ... which tend to limit the supply or to fix the price of
goods entering into interstate commerce, or which have been executed for that purpose,
are within the prohibitions of the Act. . . ." 283 U.S. 163, 169 (1931). Cf. also United
States v. National Lead, 332 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1947), where the court held the existence
of monopoly as being crucial.
28 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
28 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
30 Supra note 24.
31 "In short, he and his associates get the benefits of a conspiracy or combination
in restraint of competition. That is more than an 'exclusive right' to an invention;
it's an 'exclusive right' to form a combination with competitors to fix the prices of the
products of invention." 333 U.S. 287, 319 (1948) (Douglas concurring).
82 Supra note 9.
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patent monopoly that any exchange of patent rights between two or more
parties may be deemed to be a violation of the antitrust laws. Such a restrictive
view of patent rights, while coming close to abolishing the patent monopoly,
will clearly lead to a curtailment of patent exchanging in industry, when the
apparent effect of the exchange is to benefit both parties to the agreement. This
curtailment of exchangeability may in turn lead to a lessening of competition if
the parties, reluctant to face antitrust suits, refuse to license other parties to
use their developments. Further, this natural progression of conclusions from
recent cases, emphasizing concerted activity, appears to be in direct conflict
with the statutory free assignability of patent rights and the prior precedent
requiring clear evidence of a monopoly, price fixing scheme or other type of
patent abuse before patent transfers would be deemed conspiracies in
restraint of trade. •
ROBERT T. TOBIN
Antitrust—Vertical Division of Markets.—White Motor Co. v. United
Statesil Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission. 2—Restric-
tions on the ability to compete are at the heart of antitrust violations.3
These restrictions continue to vary in form, as different in technique as there
are differences in the whole mercantile sphere. Even so, while the form may
generally govern a court's approach to a possible restraint, it is rather the
effect of the restrictive market distribution agreements which should dictate
the response.' This duality in antitrust litigation becomes especially evident
when the court is presented with a sui generis of form; as in the cases here
noted, the two courts confront initially the vertical territory limitation. 5 In
the one instance—White Motor—a wholesale manufacturer of trucks, and
the other—Snap-On Tools—a wholesale producer of tool equipment, each
decided that the sound method of marketing its product was the use of
independent distributorships. The independence, however, was less than total
since the truck and the tool retailers each signed a contract limiting their
access to markets by prescribing delineated geographic areas in which a
distributor or retailer could do business. Additionally, there could be no com-
petition with the manufacturer in acquiring certain large accounts, e.g.,
government contracts.
The essential quality of the form of the respective practices was that the
origin of the restraints on market areas came from the manufacturer down to
the distributor. In the instance of White Motor Co., there were also signed
1 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
2 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
3 [A]greements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose
the destruction of competition . . are injurious to the public interest and void.
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Son Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
4 The test of illegality under the Sherman Act is the presence of an unreasonable
restraint without regard to whether the conspiracy is among affiliated parties or those
integrated under common ownership or among those otherwise independent. United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947).
5 The note will treat primarily the geographic restrictions imposed by the manu-
facturer; the restrictions on the classes of customers to be served raise substantially the
same issues.
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